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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LET THEM EAT
CAKE-MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. V. COLO.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, 138 S. CT. 1719 (2018).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an
individual's free exercise of religion.' The Fourteenth Amendment ensures
no state shall deny someone equal protection under the law.2 Flowing from
these fundamental freedoms is an oft-deliberated balance between religious
exemptions and antidiscrimination laws in cases involving sexual
orientation.3 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,' the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission examined the state's possible religious
hostility when adjudicating the case.' The Court held that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission did not rule with the religious neutrality required by the
Constitution.'
Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, offers a
variety of baked goods including custom-designed cakes for events such as
weddings and birthdays.' Jack Phillips, an expert baker who has owned and
operated the cakeshop for over twenty-four years, is a devout Christian.'
Due to Phillips's deeply-held religious beliefs, he claimed that making a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple was a violation of his religious
principles.9 Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, a gay couple, visited

I

See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and AntidiscriminationLaw in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. 201, 203 (2018) (describing tension between religious
exemptions and antidiscrimination laws in sexual orientation cases).
4 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
5 See id (introducing main issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop). Caution against religious
hostility, or the state's bias against a citizen's religious belief, calls for a neutral application of a

State's law in a Free Exercise Clause case. Id. at 1733-35 (Kagan, J., concurring).
6 See id. at 1724 (majority opinion) (setting forth holding).
See id. (describing cakeshop's offerings to customers).
8 See id. at 1724 (citation omitted) (introducing cakeshop's owner). In the complaint, Phillips
"explained that his 'main goal in life is to be obedient to' Jesus Christ and Christ's 'teachings in all
aspects of his life' and . . seeks to 'honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop."' Id.
9 See id. (describing Phillips's opposition to making wedding cakes for gay couples). In the
complaint, Phillips said, "'God's intention for marriage from the beginning of history is that it is
and should be the union of one man and one woman."' Id.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop in the summer leading up to their wedding hoping to
order a cake for their celebration."o Phillips explained to the couple that he
did not create wedding cakes for same-sex couples because of his religious
opposition to same-sex marriage and further because Colorado did not
recognize same-sex marriage at the time." In September 2012, shortly after
the couple's visit to Masterpiece Cakeshop, Craig and Mullins filed a
discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop. 12
The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and forbids the
discriminatory practice of denying "public accommodation" to same-sex
couples." The Colorado Civil Rights Commission, an appellate body
established by CADA to review matters of discrimination, conducted a
formal hearing addressing the alleged discrimination of Craig and Mullins
by Phillips.14 At the hearing, Phillips argued that requiring him to make a
10 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724 (pointing out how Phillips refused to service
same-sex couple). At the time of the 2012 encounter, Colorado did not recognize same-sex
marriage. Id. As such, Craig and Mullins planned to first legally wed in Massachusetts and later
hold a celebration with their family and friends in Denver, Colorado. Id.
" See id (explaining Phillips's reasoning for refusing to make wedding cake). Phillips further
explained in his complaint that "'to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something
that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and
participation in the ceremony and relationship [Craig and Mullins] were entering into."' Id; see
also Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding state may not deny marriage
license based solely on sex). Following Kitchen, county clerks for states within the Tenth Circuit,
which includes Colorado, began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. See John Aguilar,
Boulder County begins issuing same-sex marriage licenses; AG says no, DENVER POST (June 25,
2014, 10:14 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2014/06/25/boulder-county-begins-issuing-samesex-marriage-licenses-ag-says-no/ (describing issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
12 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725 (elucidating Craig and Mullins's decision to
sue Masterpiece Cakeshop). In the complaint, the couple alleged they were "denied 'full and equal
service' at the [cakeshop] because of their sexual orientation and that it was Phillips'[s] 'standard
business practice' not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings." Id.
13 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018) ("It is a discriminatory practice and
unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a
group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national
origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. . .. "). CADA defines
"public accommodation" broadly to include "any place of business engaged in any sales to the
public and any place offering services ... to the public," but excludes "a church, synagogue,
mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes." Id. at § 24-34-601(1).
14 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725 (explaining how Masterpiece Cakeshop was
initially adjudicated). Complaints arising under CADA are addressed, in the first instance, by the
Colorado Civil Rights Division and then, if probable cause is found, the matter is referred to the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Id. During the Commission's formal public hearings, two
commissioners made comments that the Court deemed to "cast doubt on the fairness and
impartiality of the Commission's adjudication." Id. at 1730. One commissioner stated that "Phillips
can believe 'what he wants to believe,' but cannot act on his religious beliefs 'if he decides to do
business in the state."' Id at 1729. Another commissioner stated that using the freedom of religion
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cake for a same-sex couple would violate his First Amendment rights to free
speech and free exercise of religion." However, the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission ordered Phillips to "'cease and desist from discriminating
against ... same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any
product [the bakery] would sell to heterosexual couples."'l6 Phillips
appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Commission's decision." After the Colorado Supreme Court declined to
hear the case, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.18
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects citizens'
right to practice their religion free from masked or overt government
hostility.19 With respect to the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise of
religion, the government cannot impose burdens that are hostile to a citizen's
religious beliefs and cannot act in a manner that presumes the illegitimacy
of a citizen's religious beliefs and practices.20 While it is true that the
religious activities of individuals are subject to regulation by the states in the
exercise of their power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of

to justify discrimination like slavery and the Holocaust are some of the "most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use." Id. at 1729 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12).
15 See id. at 1726 (explaining Phillips's legal argument).
16 See id. (alteration in original) (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. at 58a) (explaining
Commission's holding). The Civil Rights Commission did not agree that Phillips's creating a
wedding cake for Craig and Mullins would force him to adhere to "'an ideological point of view'
that would be seen as violating his freedom of speech. Id (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a).
Furthermore, the Commission upheld the view that CADA is a "'valid and neutral law of general
applicability"' and in applying it to the present case, the free exercise of religion clause of the First
Amendment was not violated. Id.
17 See id. (recognizing Phillips's appeal). The court reasoned that the "Free Exercise Clause
'does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability' on the ground that following the law would interfere with religious practice or belief."
Id. at 1727 (citing Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 289 (2015)).
8 See id (announcing Supreme Court's decision to hear Masterpiece Cakeshop).
19 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)) (citation omitted) (quoting Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)) (citation omitted) ("Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free
Exercise Clause ... extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause 'forbids subtle departures
from neutrality,' and 'covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.' Official action that targets
religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the
requirement of facial neutrality."); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664,696 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.").
20 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 543 ("The principle that government, in
pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free
Exercise Clause."); see also Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) ("If the purpose or
effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect.").
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their citizens, it is also true that the states cannot deny religiously-grounded
conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 2
Supreme Court decisions have established that gay persons and
couples may not be discriminated against because of their sexual orientation
and are considered a protected class of citizens.22 While people with
religious objections to a protected class are accommodated, these objections
generally do not allow business owners to deny people equal access to goods
and services.23 Historically, the Supreme Court protects people from
discrimination in the name of religious liberty, particularly discrimination of
individuals in a protected class.2 4
At the time the events leading to this litigation unraveled, Colorado
did not recognize the validity of same-sex marriages.2 5 In the past, Colorado
prohibited discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, in places of public accommodation.2 6 Cases concerning
21 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973)
("A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to
pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220
(1972) (holding certain religiously-grounded conduct is beyond state's control, "even under
regulations of general applicability.").
22 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law
and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."); see also Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,2604-05 (2015)
("[U]nder the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of
the same-sex may not be deprived of [the fundamental right to marry].").
23 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) ("[Pjrovisions . . . are well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature has
reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not ... violate the
First or Fourteenth Amendments."); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n.5
(1968) (per curiam) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 438 (4th Cir.
1967) (Winter, J., concurring)) (asserting defendant's belief that Act "contravenes ... will of God"
and impedes "free exercise of ... religion" are not grounds for discrimination). In Hurley, the focal
point of the state's prohibition was to discriminate "against individuals in the provision of publicly
available goods, privileges, and services." 515 U.S. at 572.
24 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (holding right to marry is fundamental right guaranteed
under Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-71
(1973) (declaring pro-life religious liberties do not undermine women's equality); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (preventing marriage based on race violates Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,486 (1954) (holding racial segregation
of public schools deprives minority group of equal protection).
25 See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 (2012) ("Only a union of one man and one woman shall be
valid or recognized as a marriage in this state."); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (holding
marriages, both heterosexual and same-gender, are guaranteed under Fourteenth Amendment);
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 749 (2013) (ruling Defense of Marriage Act is
unconstitutional).
26 See 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 132-33 (guaranteeing equal enjoyment of certain public places
for all regardless of race, color, or servitude); see also 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws 139 (amending
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discrimination are adjudicated under the CADA which is an administrative
system tasked with resolving discrimination claims.2 7 The administrative
system is required to review all Free Exercise Clause cases with neutrality
and absent of hostility towards citizens' religious beliefs.
In 2015, the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission heard a series of cases involving
complaints that alleged bakers discriminated against citizens by refusing to
bake cakes depicting hostile messages aimed towards gay persons. 2 9 The
Commission found that the bakers' ultimate refusal to bake cakes displaying
hateful messages fell within the constitutional rights of the bakers.30
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission failed to decide Phillips's case with the
neutrality required when addressing Free Exercise Clause cases.31
According to the Court, inappropriate and dismissive comments made by
two commissioners during the hearing process indicated a lack of due
consideration for Phillips's free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced.3 2
previous antidiscrimination law to extend protection to "all other places of public
accommodation"); see also COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-601(2)(a) (2018) ("It is a discriminatory
practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an
individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation . . . ."). CADA
was amended in 2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
places of public accommodation. § 24-34-601(2)(a).
27 See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4-105(14), 24-34-306 (2018) (laying out procedural

determinations).
28 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993)
(highlighting Free Exercise Clause cases must be examined free of hostility toward citizen's
religious beliefs).
29 See Jack v. Gateaux. Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civ. Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015)
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf; Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No.
Div.
Mar.
24,
2015)
(Colo.
Civ.
Rights
P20140070X
http://www.adfinedia.org/files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf; Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No.
Mar.
24,
2015)
Civ.
Rights
Div.
P20140069X
(Colo.
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/AzucarDecision.pdf [hereinafter Jack cases] (offering cases with
similar factual circumstances). In each of these cases, the plaintiff requested two cakes, one that
resembled an open Bible and decorated with the biblical verses "God hates sin. Psalm 45:7," and
"Homosexuality is a detestable sin. Leviticus 18:2." Jack cases, supra note 29. The second cake
depicted two groomsmen holding hands with a red X over the image and the words, "God loves
sinners" and "While we were yet sinners Christ died for us. Romans 5:8." Id
30 See Jack cases, supra note 29 (concluding bakers acted lawfully in declining to create cakes
that demeaned gay persons and weddings).
31 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 ("The Civil Rights Commission's treatment
of [Phillips's] case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere
religious beliefs that motivated his objection.").
32 See id ("Phillips can believe 'what he wants to believe,' but cannot act on his religious
beliefs 'if he decides to do business in the state' [and] 'if a businessman wants to do business in the
state and he's got an issue with the-the law's impacting his personal belief system, he needs to
look at being able to compromise."'). Another commissioner commented during the hearing:
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The majority opinion warned that these comments made by the
commissioners were inappropriate, especially when considering the
commission's primary responsibility is to uphold the fair and neutral
enforcement of Colorado's antidiscrimination law.33
The Supreme Court wrongly concluded that Craig and Mullins
should lose the case by relying too heavily on the comments made by two
commissioners in deciding for Phillips.34 These comments, which came
from only two of seven commissioners, on one of the four decision-making
entities, are not probative in light of the totality of the circumstances and
should not justify reversing the lower court's judgment." The facts of this
case are far removed from those of Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, the case the majority relied upon, where there was merely
one decision-making body, the city council.36
The Court further misidentified the issue when it failed to properly
distinguish the Jack cases from the case at hand.3 7 In the Jack cases, the
bakers refused to provide a cake that displayed hateful messages demeaning
gay persons and gay marriage." The bakers' refusal to make a cake with

Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be-I
mean, we-we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used
to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric
that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others.
Id.
3 See id. ("To describe a man's faith as 'one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that
people can use' is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as
despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical-something insubstantial and even
insincere.").
34 See id. at 1729-30 (reiterating holding).
35 See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining steps involved in proceedings).
"First, the
Division had to find probable cause that Phillips violated CADA. Second, the [judge] entertained
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Third, the Commission heard Phillips'[s] appeal.
Fourth, after the Commission's ruling, the Colorado Court of Appeals considered the case de novo."
Id.
36 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993)
(reversing city council's ruling that government's actions violated principle of religious neutrality).
The minutes from a meeting showed "significant hostility" from the city council members, other
city officials, and residents, towards the plaintiff and their practice of animal sacrifice. Id. at 541.
These meetings were further interrupted when the public crowd cheered in approval of critical
comments made by city council members and taunted the president of the Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye when he spoke. Id.
37 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1750 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Craig and Mullins
simply requested a wedding cake: They mentioned no message or anything else distinguishing the
cake they wanted to buy from any other wedding cake Phillips would have sold.").
38 See id at 1751 (alternations in original) (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a, n.8) ('The
Division found that the bakeries did not refuse [Jack's] request because of his creed, but rather
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Jack's requested message would extend to any customer, regardless of
religion.39
In the present case, Phillips refused to sell any cake at all to Craig
and Mullins.40 Phillips's decision not to sell Craig and Mullins a cake-the
kind of cake he regularly sold to other people-was based solely on the
couple's sexual orientation. 4' Unlike the Jack cases, where the bakers
refused to make cakes based on the hateful messages displayed on the cakes,
a wedding cake for a gay couple does not signal support for homosexual
weddings in general, but rather for that couple's wedding specifically.4 2
Phillips refused to create a cake he personally found offensive based solely
on the individuals' sexual orientation.4 3
The Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop considered whether the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission reviewed Phillips's case with the
religious neutrality constitutionally required by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. Deciding against Craig and Mullins, the Court
mistakenly relied too heavily on careless comments made by two
commissioners who made up a seven-commissioner panel and were part of
a larger, four-layer proceeding. While obsessing over those trivial, off-hand
comments, the majority missed the significance of the matter. Under a
sensible application of CADA, Phillips's refusal to sell a wedding cake to
Craig and Mullins solely on the basis of their sexual orientation and decision
to marry was discriminatory toward a protected class of citizens and,
therefore, unconstitutional.
Timothy Rennie

because of the offensive nature of the requested message ... [T]here was no evidence that the
bakeries based their decisions on [Jack's] religion. . . .').
3 See id at 1750 (emphasizing differences in Jack cases). The bakers in the Jack cases would
have sold Jack or anyone else any baked good including a wedding cake, as long as the bakers did
not find the requested messages for the cake to be discriminatory or hateful. Id. at 1749. In contrast,
Phillips refused to sell Craig and Mullins a cake solely because the couple is gay. Id. at 1751.
40 See id at 1751 (second alteration in original) ("[R]efusal 'to design a special cake with
words or images ... might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all."').
41 See id. at 1750 ("Phillips would not provide a good or service to a same-sex couple that he
would provide to a heterosexual couple.").
42 See id at 1750 (emphasis in original) ("When a couple contacts a bakery for a wedding cake,
the product they are seeking is a cake celebrating their wedding-not a cake celebrating
heterosexual weddings or same-sex weddings-and that is the service Craig and Mullins were
denied.").
43 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1750 (emphasis added) ("Phillips declined to make
a cake he found offensive where the offensiveness of the product was determined solely by the
identity of the customer requesting it.").

